Touro Law Review
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 8

1995

Calmer Seas: The Supreme Court's Major Criminal Law Rulings Of
The 1993-94 Term
William E. Hellerstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth
Amendment Commons, Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Hellerstein, William E. (1995) "Calmer Seas: The Supreme Court's Major Criminal Law Rulings Of The
1993-94 Term," Touro Law Review: Vol. 11: No. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/8

This Symposium: The Supreme Court and Local Government Law is brought to you for free and open access by
Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

CALMER SEAS: THE SUPREME COURT'S
MAJOR CRIMINAL LAW RULINGS OF THE
1993-94 TERM
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:

Our next speaker is Professor William Hellerstein, from
Brooklyn Law School, who has been a speaker at all six of our
conferences. He is, in his own right, well recognized throughout
the state. During my own service in the Second Department, I
recall that while Hellerstein was the Chief of the Appeals Bureau at
the Legal Aid Society, it was the best appellate operation,
including the ones involving the District Attorney's Offices, in the
various counties in the Appellate Division, Second Department. He
has been nominated to be appointed a Judge of the New York State
Court of Appeals by the New York State Nominating Commission.
Is it seven or eight times?
Professor William E. Hellerstein:

Just four.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:

My God, only four? I was nominated three times myself. It is
only four so I am disappointed. I suppose I should not have asked.
In any event, we are fortunate in that he has not been appointed so
we can have him as a speaker at our conference. He is certainly, I
think, one of the leading experts on Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment criminal law issues. He has many cases to deal with,
so it is my pleasure to introduce him.
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Professor William E. Hellerstein*:
INTRODUCTION

Ihank you, Judge Lazer. I always enjoy coming to Touro Law
School to participate in this symposium. After hearing Professor
Margulies, I feel very good. I had not perceived in the cases which
he discussed as much gold as he found in them.
I would call this a "calmer seas" Term. But there were some
notable features. I will first talk about the personalities on the
current Court and some of the workload aspects of the Court before
I get into the cases.
Among the noteworthy features of the Supreme Court's 1993-94
Term are that it produced the fewest signed opinions --eighty-four- since the 1955-56 Term, as compared to 140 which the Court was
averaging just a few terms ago. Additionally, the justices were
noticeably less polarized than in recent years. Last Term there were
twenty five-to-four decisions; this Term there were fourteen. 1
Also, the discourse among the justices appeared more pragmatic
and less ideological.
This mellower ambiance was reflected in the Court's criminal
law decisions. This is not to say that this Term was without interest
or even excitement. The Court ruled on important issues as to
police interrogation; 2 federal sentencing; 3 double jeopardy; 4 and
jury instructions. 5 For a second consecutive year, the Court also
showed that it would not be a compliant partner in government's
6
use of civil forfeiture and other schemes in the war on drugs.
Also, the Court decided three cases involving the interpretation of
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Juris Doctor, Harvard Law
School (1962).
1. See Marcia Coyle, In Search of an Identity, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 1994,
at C2.
2. See infra notes 21-81 & accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 82-137 & accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 158-230 & accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 231-55 & accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 138-57 & accompanying text.
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federal criminal statutes as to intent, 7 the scope of the hearsay
exception for statements against penal interest, 8 and the right of a
defendant who asserts an insanity defense to have the jury charged
as to the consequences of an insanity acquittal. 9 Lastly, although in
a civil case, the Court placed gender on the same footing with race
in the exercise of jury peremptory challenges; 10 a ruling with
important consequences for criminal trials. As in the past, I again
will not discuss the Court's capital punishment cases because we
are still an abolition state. If the upcoming election changes that, I
will request more time for my future presentations.
As to personalities, the 1993 Term had a number of intriguing
facets. It brought to a close the remarkable tenure of Justice
Blackmun, a jurist who, appointed by President Nixon to stem the
Warren Court's liberalism, finished his twenty-four year tenure as
the Court's most liberal member. Also, the Term saw Justice
Souter continue his left-of-center leanings as he again infused his
work with the erudition and intellectual depth that I remarked on
last year. 11 It is these qualities that make Justice Souter a key
12
member of the Court.
With Justice Blackmun retired, Justice Souter may be his most
likely replacement in what remains of the Court's liberal wing (a
rather small space whose most frequent occupant, after Justice
Blackmun, is Justice Stevens). Consider, that in contrast to Justice
Ginsburg, a former ACLU attorney, "who voted almost as often
with the Chief Justice as she did with Justice Blackmun in cases in
which those two justices were on opposite sides," Justice Souter
agreed with Justice Blackmun more than twice as often as he did
with the Chief Justice. 13 It is important to also note that in the four
habeas corpus cases last Term, Justice Souter voted for the prisoner
See infra notes 284-322 & accompanying text.
See infra notes 341-62 & accompanying text.
See infra notes 256-83 & accompanying text.
See infra notes 363-95 & accompanying text.
11. William E. Hellerstein, Sotto Voce: The Supreme Court's Low Key But
Not Insignificant Criminal Lmv Rulings During the 1992 Term, 10 TOURo L.
REv. 355 (1994).
12. See David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
7.
8.
9.
10.

1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
13. See Coyle, supra note 1,at C3.
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each time while Justice Ginsburg voted for the prisoner only
twice. 14 In the previous Term, Justice Souter voted for the prisoner
in four of six habeas corpus cases, giving him a two-year batting
average for prisoners of .800.15
It is too early, of course, to predict Justice Breyer's direction.
"Pragmatic" was the most frequent label given to him during the
confirmation process. 16 His criminal law profile on the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also reflects that
assessment. Consequently, there is little basis to conclude that in
criminal cases he will emerge left of Justice Souter. However, there
is better than an even chance that he will be in Souter's company
more often than not -- and that Justice Ginsburg will be there also.
This creates a solid centrist core with Justice Stevens on the left
flank and makes Justice Kennedy a justice to whom, in Arthur
Miller's term, "attention must be paid."
As stated earlier, last Term, fourteen cases were decided by a
five-to-four vote. Justice Kennedy was in the majority in thirteen
of them. 17 He was followed by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia,
each of whom was in the majority in ten of the fourteen splits. 18
Least often in the majority were Justices Blackmun, Stevens and
Ginsburg. 19 Thus, even if Justice Breyer or Justice Souter were to
replace Justice Blackmun as the "house liberal," a fifth vote on that
side of the aisle still would be needed. 20 Trolling for Justice
Kennedy's vote by criminal defense counsel during the coming
Term should make for interesting sport.

14. See Coyle, supra note 1, at C3.
15. See Coyle, supra note 1, at C3.
16. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Breyer Belatedly Gets His While House
Ceremony, WASH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1994, at A9.
17. See Coyle, supranote 1, at C2.
18. See Coyle, supra note 1, at C2.
19. See Coyle, supra note 1, at C2.

20. A word of caution is needed about Justice Blackmun's image in
criminal cases; it is not accurate to consider him a "liberal." An examination of
his decisions, dissents, and votes will not sustain it.
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I. CONFESSIONS AND POLICE INTERROGATION
In Davis v. United States,2 1 the Court held that the police may
continue questioning a suspect who makes an ambiguous request
for counsel and that, while it may be "good police practice for the
interviewing officers to clarify whether or not [the suspect]
actually wants an attorney," the majority would not impose a
22
requirement that clarification be sought.
Davis, a sailor stationed at the Charleston Navy Base, was
suspected of beating a fellow sailor to death with a pool cue stick
and was eventually arrested by Navy investigators, given Miranda
warnings, and signed a written waiver.2 3 After he was questioned
for about an hour and a half, Davis stated, "Maybe I should talk to
a lawyer." 24 The investigators ceased questioning him about the
murder but asked him questions seeking clarification as to whether
he actually wanted a lawyer.2 5 After the investigators attempted to
clarify Davis' statement concerning a lawyer, Davis said he did not
want to speak to a lawyer. The investigators then continued
questioning Davis for another hour until Davis finally stated that
he would not answer any more questions without a lawyer. 26
However, by that time, Davis had said enough to sink himself.
In Edwards v. Arizona,27 the Court held that a suspect who
waives his rights but then requests counsel at any time during
interrogation may not be subjected to further police-initiated
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him. 28 In the
years since Edwards, courts have struggled with the question of
ambiguous counsel requests. The predominant view, and that
21. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
22. Id. at 2356.
23. Id. at 2352-53.
24. Id. at 2353.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
28. Id. at 484-85. The Court also held that "when an accused has invoked
his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of
that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights."
Id. at 484.
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chosen by the Court of Military Appeals in Davis, approved the
stop-and-clarify approach. 29 Although the government opposed
Davis' argument for a bright-line rule that would trigger Edwards
upon an ambiguous remark, it also asked the Court to reject a
countervailing rule that would allow the police "to ignore any
request for counsel but one articulated in precisely the right
30
terms."
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice O'Connor, not
surprisingly, rejected both Davis' position and, quite surprisingly,
the government's position, and held that, "after a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers
may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly
requests an attorney." 3 1 Despite the acknowledgment that often it
will be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify
whether or not the suspect actually wants an attorney, the Court
would not adopt a rule requiring the police to ask clarifying
questions. 32 Thus, wrote Justice O'Connor, "[i]f the suspect's
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for
'33
counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him."
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and
Ginsburg, concurred only in the decision to affirm Davis'
conviction. Justice Souter insisted that the Court's Miranda
jurisprudence mandates a broader interpretation of a suspect's
request for counsel and that the stop-and-clarify approach, adopted
by the Court of Military Appeals, is more consistent with that
obligation and with the practicalities of "the real world."'34
The majority's rejection of the narrower ground for affirmance,
as espoused by the government, is yet another reflection of the
Court's extremely crabbed view of Miranda. Once again we were
29. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. See, e.g., Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536,
539 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that officers must cease questioning of suspect
and clarify with suspect whether suspect has unambiguously requested an
attorney).
30. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354.
31. Id. at 2356.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2355 (Souter, J., concurring).
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reminded that Miranda protections, including the prohibition on
further questioning after invocation of the right to counsel, are
prophylactic and not constitutional mandates. As Justice O'Connor
emphasized, the Edwards rule serves only to ensure against police
badgering suspects into waiving previously asserted Miranda
rights and that
when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not
know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring
the immediate cessation of questioning 'would transform the
Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate
police investigative activity,' ... because it would needlessly
prevent the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of
counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer
35
present.
Justice O'Connor conceded that "requiring a clear assertion of
the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects whobecause of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety
of other reasons--will not clearly articulate their right to counsel
although they actually want to have a lawyer present. ' '36 She
discounted this, however, because the "primary protection"
afforded by Miranda is the warnings themselves, and if a suspect
waives his right to counsel after his rights have been explained, it
is not too much to ask that the suspect affirmatively assert his
desire for counsel before the Edwards safeguards become
operative. 37
Despite haling from the pastoral surroundings of New
Hampshire, Justice Souter seems in greater touch with the realities
of custodial interrogation than the majority is willing to admit to.
He noted that criminal suspects, because of their backgrounds and
the pressures they face, are "an odd group to single out for the
Court's demand of heightened linguistic care."' 38 More
importantly, he noted that the majority's approach creates a "real
risk" of endangering a Fifth Amendment protection. 39 If a suspect
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 2355-56 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2356.
Id.
Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
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makes a statement he intends as an invocation of the right to
counsel, but which his interrogator brushes aside as being
insufficiently clear, the suspect "may well see further objection as
futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his
interrogation."'4 0 Justice Souter disputed the majority's conclusion
that its decision was foreshadowed by its prior Miranda rulings
and offered his own view that "[t]he concerns of fairness and
practicality that have long anchored our Miranda case law point to
a different response: when law enforcement officials 'reasonably
do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer,' ... they

should stop their interrogation and ask him to make his choice
41
clear."
A question that still remains open after Davis concerns whether
the police need to seek clarification where a suspect's statements
about remaining silent are ambiguous. But I doubt that the
Supreme Court would treat the issue differently than it did Davis'
ambiguous counsel request. The Eleventh Circuit, which had long
followed the stop-and-clarify rule, 42 held recently, in Coleman v.

40. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). An interesting
sidelight to the decision was Justice Scalia's concurrence. He was perplexed by
the government's avoidance of any reliance on the admissibility of confessions
standard in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 that Congress, disaffected with cases such as
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957), enacted in 1968. Id. at 2357-58 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Section 3501(a) states that "a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it
is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1985). Justice Scalia believed that
the statute appeared to render Miranda "entirely irrelevant" in some federal
cases. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring). He served notice that,
whether the government relies on the statute or not, he will insist on taking
account of § 3501 "when a case that comes within the terms of this statute is
next presented to us." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Any
statement taken by the state after the equivocal request for counsel is made, but
before it is clarified as an effective waiver of counsel, violates Miranda.");
Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 923 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("Under Miranda, the
police not only must give the suspect the now-familiar set of warnings, but also
must scrupulously honor the suspect's right to cut off questioning.").
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Singletary,4 3 that the Davis rule should be applied to assertions of
silence. 44
The Supreme Court's other Miranda decision was not
controversial and was disposed of by a per curiam decision. In
Stansbury v. California,4 5 the Court revisited the question of what
constitutes "custody" under Miranda and held that "an officer's
subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person
being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment
whether the person is in custody."'46
Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was convicted for the rape
and murder of a ten year-old girl.47 Police suspicion focused
initially on another ice cream truck driver.48 After the police
questioned him, they decided to question Stansbury. Four officers
surrounded his trailer home and one knocked on the door. When
Stansbury answered, he was told the officers were investigating a
homicide to which Stansbury was a possible witness and he was
asked if he would accompany them to the police station to answer
some questions. 4 9 Stansbury agreed and rode to the station in the
50
front seat of one of the police cars.
At the station, Stansbury was questioned without being given
Miranda warnings. 5 1 When Stansbury mentioned that he had
driven a turquoise car, a fact that matched a witness' statement, the
officer's suspicion was aroused. 52 When Stansbury next admitted
to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping, and child molestation,
43. 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit held that "[a]
suspect must articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity
that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent." Id. at 1424.
Furthermore, the court held that where "the statement is ambiguous or
equivocal, then the police have no duty to clarify the suspect's intent, and they
may proceed with the interrogation." Id.
44. Id.
45. 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994) (per curiam).
46. Id.at 1527.
47. Id. at 1528.
48. Id. at 1527.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 1528.
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53
questioning stopped and Miranda warnings were administered.
54
Stansbury asked for an attorney and made no further statements.
The trial court denied suppression of Stansbury's statements and
its fruits, ruling that Stansbury was not in custody until he made
his statement about the turquoise car, primarily because until that
moment, the detective who interrogated him was focused on the
other truck driver, and not on Stansbury. 55 The California Supreme
Court affirmed, applying a "totality of the circumstances" test in
'56
which "no one factor is dispositive."
Because the California court may have included in its analysis
the subjective belief of the interrogating officer, the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In a fair turnabout,
the Court reiterated the point it had made in two prior decisions,
Beckwith v. United States57 and Berkemer v. McCarty,5 8 in which
it was the defendant who claimed that he was in custody because of
the subjective beliefs of the police. The Court reiterated that, under
Miranda, the test for custody is whether there was a formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with
a formal arrest, and that the "subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating officers or the person being questioned" are
59
irrelevant; the "objective circumstances" control.
In United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,60 the Court resolved an
issue which, in certain contexts, affects the interrelationship

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id. The California Supreme Court set forth additional factors that were

important considerations in determining the applicable legal standard, including
"'(1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on
the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the
length and form of questioning."' Id. (citation omitted).
57. 425 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (holding that a defendant who made
incriminating statements in a private home without being given Mirandarights
was not in custody for Mirandapurposes).
58. 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (stating that a police officer's subjective
belief has no bearing on whether an individual is in custody at a particular
moment and that the only question relevant to the court is how a reasonable
person in the individual's position would have perceived the situation).
59. Stansbury, 114 S.Ct. at 1529.
60. 114 S.Ct. 1599 (1994).
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between state and federal law enforcement authorities. The case
concerns the scope of the federal statute that governs the
61
admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.
Section 3501 of Title 18,62 to which I alluded earlier in my
discussion of Davis, was enacted in 1968 by a Congress disaffected
with both Miranda and the McNabb-Mallory doctrine that rendered
inadmissible in federal prosecutions otherwise voluntary
confessions obtained during presentment delay.6 3 Subsection (a) of
section 3501 states that in federal prosecutions "a
confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given. ' '64 Subsection (c) provides, however, that statements made
within six hours following a defendant's "arrest or other detention
in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement
agency shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in
bringing [the defendant] before a magistrate.",65 Thus, there is the
question of whether subsection (c), the safe harbor provision, was
intended to be a limitation on subsection (a), so that any statement,
although voluntary, made outside the safe harbor period, is
nonetheless inadmissible.
In Alvarez-Sanchez, the defendant was arrested by Los Angeles
County deputy sheriffs on state drug charges who found him in
possession of counterfeit United States currency. 66 They held him
over the weekend and called the Secret Service on Monday
morning. Federal agents arrived, warned the defendant as to his
61. Id. at 1600.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985).

63. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957) ("But [a
defendant] is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to ... elicit

damaging statements to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt [without a
prompt arraignment as stated in Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure]."); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1943) (holding
that incriminating statements made by a defendant as a result of defendant's
unlawful detention for two days in a barren cell without access to a magistrate,
and subjected to questioning for five hours was in "flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded [under Rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure]").
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1985).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1995).
66. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. at 1601.
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Miranda rights and secured a waiver. During the ensuing
interrogation, the defendant incriminated himself.67 The agents
then took custody of the defendant, who was subsequently
arraigned, indicted, and convicted of federal counterfeiting
crimes. 68
The Ninth Circuit ruled that section 3501's "arrest or other
detention" language included time spent in state custody and that
subsection (c)'s safe harbor period expired sometime before the
defendant's statements to the federal agents. 69 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the statute precludes suppression under McNabb70
Mallory of a confession given during the safe harbor period.
Nonetheless, despite subsection (a)'s focus on voluntariness,
voluntary confessions made beyond the six-hour safe harbor period
71
are excludable solely on the basis of pre-arraignment delay.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Thomas.
Although the government argued that section 3501 was intended
by Congress to supersede McNabb-Mallory completely and thus, a
confession made beyond the safe harbor period is admissible if
voluntary, the Court did not address that argument. 72 Instead,
Justice Thomas construed the statute to excise the relevance of the
defendant's time in state custody. 73 He concluded that "'arrest or
other detention"' in section 3501(c) means an "'arrest or other
detention' for a violation of federal law."'74 He noted that
subsection (c) deals with "delay" in presentment. 75 That term, he
emphasized, "presumes an obligation to act."' 76 He thus reasoned
that

67. Id. The respondent admitted that he had knowledge of the fact that the

currency was counterfeit. Id.
68. Id. at 1601-02.
69. Id. at 1602.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1603.
73. Id. at 1604.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1603.
76. Id. at 1603-04.
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there can be no 'delay' in bringing a person before a federal
magistrate until, at a minimum, there is some obligation to bring
the person before such a judicial officer in the first
place .... Until a person is arrested or detained for a federal
crime, there is no duty, obligation, or reason to bring him before a
judicial official 'empowered to commit persons charged with [a
federal] offense... 277
Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated that "[a]s long as a person is
arrested and held only on state charges by state or local authorities,
the provisions of section 3501(c) are not triggered. ' ' 78 This is true,
Justice Thomas observed, even if state arresting officials "believe
jor have cause to believe that the person also may have violated
79
federal law."
In a brief concurrence Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Blackmun, emphasized that "we do not decide today a question on
which the Courts of Appeals remain divided: the effect of section
3501(c) on confessions obtained more than six hours after an arrest
on federal charges."' 80 In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens
expressed concern about possibilities for collusion between local
and federal officials and stated that he "would not assume that
section 3501(c) will never 'come into play' until a suspect is
arrested on a federal charge." 8 1
II. SENTENCING ISSUES
In recent years, the Court's docket has contained a significant
number of sentencing issues, many of which have arisen under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Last year was no different. In two
cases, Nichols v. UnitedStates82 and Custis v. United States,83 the
Court faced the question of when a defendant's past convictions
could be used to justify a harsher sentence in the case at bar.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1604 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1605 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1606 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
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In Nichols, the issue was "[w]hether the Constitution prohibits a
sentencing court from considering a defendant's previous
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in sentencing him for a
subsequent offense."' 84 Resolution of the issue proved difficult as
the Court ruled six-to-three for the government, with Justice Souter
authoring a concurrence in which he disputed not only the
majority's overruling of a prior decision but also its determination
85
to reach the constitutional issues presented at all.
In 1990, Nichols pleaded guilty to a cocaine conspiracy
charge. 86 He also had a 1983 federal felony drug conviction and a
1983 state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence
for which he was fined $250 but was not imprisoned. 87 Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the misdemeanor conviction raised
Nichols' Criminal History Category from category II to category
III, which increased his sentencing range from 168-210 months to
188-235 months. 88 Nichols challenged the use of his uncounseled
state misdemeanor conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, 89
relying heavily on Baldasarv. Illinois.90 The Sixth Circuit rejected
his claim and affirmed his conviction. 91
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, overruled
Baldasar and held that imposition of prison time under a sentence
enhancement scheme as a result of a prior uncounseled conviction
is not the same as directly sentencing an uncounseled defendant to
93
prison, 92 which is prohibited by Scott v. Illinois.

84. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.

85. Id. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1924.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 446 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (per curiam).
91. United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct.
1921 (1994).
92. Nichols, 114 S.Ct. at 1927
93. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) ("[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent

criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.").
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Baldasar proved a weak foundation for a defendant such as
Nichols. Baldasar had succeeded in persuading a majority of the
Court that his uncounseled misdemeanor conviction should not be
used to convert a second misdemeanor into a felony. However, the
"holding" in Baldasardefied description. The case was decided by
a per curiam opinion which contained no rationale of its own.
Instead, it referred to "the reasons stated in the [three] concurring
opinions," each of which sported a different rationale, with none
94
commanding five votes.
The Chief Justice Rehnquist did not try to sort out the Baldasar
puzzle. Instead, he embraced Justice Stewart's Baldasar
concurrence and Justice Powell's Baldasardissent. Justice Stewart
had concluded that Scott was violated because Baldasar's prior
uncounseled conviction automatically triggered a prison term
under Illinois' sentencing scheme. 95 Justice Powell had argued that
under Scott, a sentence that was good when entered was available
for later consideration in a sentence enhancement scheme. 9 6 Thus,
as drawn by the Chief Justice, the line of demarcation was that
between "criminal proceedings which resulted in imprisonment,
97
and those which did not."
Having selected this distinguishing fault-line, the Chief Justice
found reliance on a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
well within traditional sentencing practices. 9 8 He noted that a
sentencing judge may always consider a wide range of information
from any source, including the defendant's criminal history, and
that "courts have not only taken into consideration a defendant's
prior convictions, but have also considered a defendant's past
criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that
behavior." 99 The constitutionality of this practice, he observed,
was sustained in Williams v. New York,100 and in McMillan v.
94. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 224.

95. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 1928.

100. 337 U.S. 241,252 (1949) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not
render a defendant's sentence invalid because additional out-of-court
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Pennsylvania,1 0 1 where the Court held that such prior conduct
102
need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because a defendant may be sentenced more harshly for a later
crime merely on evidence of the conduct underlying a prior
conviction, it is "[s]urely ... constitutional," he argued, for a court
to consider the prior conviction itself, obtained only after the
103
conduct has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Souter's concurrence first made the interesting point that
Baldasar did not have a holding that could be overruled. 104 The
Baldasar Court was evenly divided, four to four, over whether an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that is valid under Scott
because no prison sentence was imposed may be used subsequently
to enhance a sentence. 105 Justice Blackmun, he pointed out, did
not accept the premise that a prior uncounseled conviction was
valid under Scott, and gave no indication of his view on the issue
before the Court. 106 Therefore, Justice Souter reasoned, "[o]n the
question addressed by the other eight Justices ... the Baldasar
Court was in equipoise, leaving a decision in the same posture as
an affirmance by an equally divided Court, entitled to no
107
precedential value."
Justice Souter also believed that "the difficult constitutional
question.., need not be answered in deciding this case.., for
unlike the sentence-enhancement scheme involved in Baldasar,the
Sentencing Guidelines do not provide for automatic enhancement
based on prior uncounseled convictions." 108 The guidelines "allow
information was provided to a judge when exercising his power to impose the
death penalty).
101. 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding that states may consider "visible
possession of a firearm" as a factor when sentencing rather than an element of

an offense).
102. Id. at 91.
103. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.

104. Id. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring).
105. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).

106. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
107. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 1929-30 (Souter, J., concurring). In his view, under Scott, a

sentencing judge can consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
when totaling up a defendant's criminal history because the role the guidelines
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a defendant to rebut the negative implication to which a prior
uncounseled conviction gives rise.. . ."109 Therefore, he observed,
the "concern for reliability is accommodated," and "nothing in the
Sixth Amendment or our cases requires a sentencing court to
ignore the fact of a valid uncounseled conviction, even if that
conviction is a less confident indicator of guilt than a counseled
one would be." 110
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, insisted that the majority's holding violates the
fundamental Sixth Amendment principle that "no imprisonment
may be imposed on the basis of an uncounseled conviction." 111
Taking direct issue with the majority, Justice Blackmun argued
that using prior convictions for sentencing is not the same as using
the underlying conduct. Evidence of conduct is less persuasive
than a conviction and when the prosecution uses conduct rather
than convictions, the defense has more opportunities to challenge
its reliability. 112 In a footnote, he also explained that his vote in
Baldasar stemmed from his dissent in Scott, and that "logic
dictates that, where the threat of imprisonment is enough to trigger
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel, the actual imposition
of imprisonment through an enhancement statute also requires the
113
appointment of counsel."
In Custis v. UnitedStates,114 the issue concerned the appropriate
forum in which a defendant may challenge a prior conviction's
constitutionality. 115 Involved was the sentencing-enhancement
structure of the Armed Career Criminal Act [hereinafter
ACCA]. 116 Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted for
possession of a firearm may receive an enhanced sentence if the
defendant "has three previous convictions.., for a violent felony
give prior convictions is "presumptive, not conclusive...
J., concurring).
109. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

."

Id. at 1930 (Souter,

112. Id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1932 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).

115. Id. at 1734.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1984).
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or a serious drug offense." 117 The government sought an enhanced
sentence of Custis based on his three prior state convictions. 118
Custis maintained that in two of his convictions, his attorney was
so incompetent as to deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance. 119
Writing for a six-to-three majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that Custis could not deflect enhanced sentencing under the ACCA
by challenging the competency of his past lawyers. 12 0 As a
statutory matter, Rehnquist found no authorization for collateral
review of prior convictions. 12 1 He stated that the statute speaks in
terms of the "fact of the conviction and nothing suggests that the
prior final conviction may be subject to collateral attack for
potential constitutional errors before it may be counted." 12 2 He
emphasized that in regard to prior felonies, the Act states that a
conviction "'which has been.., set aside' [may not be counted,
and thus], creates a clear negative implication that courts may
count a conviction that has not been set aside." 123
To dispose of the constitutional question, the Chief Justice had to
distinguish Burgett v. Texas1 24 and United States v. Tucker,12 5
which permitted defendants to collaterally attack, in the sentencing
117. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
118. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. The defendant had a 1985 Pennsylvania state

conviction for robbery and two Maryland state convictions, one for burglary and
the other for attempted burglary. Id.
119. Id. The defendant argued that "his attorney had failed to advise him of
the defense of involuntary intoxication, and that he would have gone to trial,
rather than plead guilty, had he been aware of that defense." Id. Furthermore,
the defendant claimed that his trial on "stipulated facts" was unfair because the
facts only established an attempted breaking and entering, not attempted
burglary. Id.

120. Id. at 1738.
121. Id. at 1737.
122. Id. at 1736.
123. Id. (citation omitted).

124. 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (holding that a prior conviction based on a
denial of the right to counsel to support guilt or enhance punishment for a

second offense is unconstitutional).
125. 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (remanding case for reconsideration as to
whether the judge improperly gave consideration to the defendant's record of

previous convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel).
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forum, prior convictions obtained in the absence of counsel. He did
so by pointing out that both cases involved claims that prior
convictions were obtained in violation of an indigent defendant's
right to appointed counsel, contrary to Gideon v. Wainwright.126
127
Denial of appointed counsel is a "unique constitutional defect,"
he reasoned, whereas none of the collateral challenges raised by
Custis, "rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect resulting from
12 8
the failure to appoint counsel at all."2
The Chief Justice also factored into the Court's decision
concerns about the finality of judgments and administrative
difficulties in resolving collateral challenges to prior convictions at
sentencing. 12 9 Deciding whether the defendant was adequately
represented in those convictions would involve judicial rummaging
through far-flung, perhaps non-existent, records. 130 Collateral
review also violated the finality principles enunciated in Parke v.
Raley, 13 1 which apply with equal force in both habeas corpus and
sentencing proceedings. Rehnquist pointed out that federal habeas
corpus was available to challenge those convictions for which a
' 132
defendant was still "in custody."
Justice Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens. He read the Act to contain an implicit intent by
Congress "to permit defendants to attempt to show at sentencing
that prior convictions were 'unconstitutionally obtained."' 133 He
126. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding a fundamental right for indigent
defendants to have the assistance of counsel at criminal trials).
127. Id. ("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.").
128. Custis, 114 S. CL at 1738.
129. Id. at 1738-89.
130. Id.
131. 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992). The Court noted that the "'presumption of
regularity' that attaches to final judgments, even when the question is waiver of
constitutional rights" is a presumption that is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.
Id. at 523.

132. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739. Rehnquist stated that should the defendant
succeed in his challenge to any of those convictions, he could then apply for a
modification of any federal sentence predicated on the defective state
conviction. Id.
133. Id. at 1740 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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pointed out that Burgett and Tucker had been decided when
Congress had drafted the ACCA, and so those decisions'
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment must have guided
Congress' intention when it wrote the statute. 134 Thus, he could
not accept that Congress' silence regarding a right to collateral
review of prior convictions used for ACCA enhancement meant
35
that Congress intended to withhold such a right. 1
Similar to his "narrow issue" approach in Nichols (and an oftrepeated Brandeis-Harlan approach that seems his signature),
Justice Souter thought it unnecessary to reach the constitutional
issue. 136 However, he addressed the constitutional issue anyway
and took direct issue with the majority's limited reading of Burgett
and Tucker. He perceived no significant distinction between
challenges to prior convictions based on a denial of the right to
appointed counsel and denials of the right to have the effective
assistance of counsel and to be free from convictions based on
37
unknowing or involuntary guilty pleas. 1
III. CIVIL FORFEITURE
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,138 the
Court dealt the government another setback in its use of civil
forfeiture against drug offenders. 139 In an opinion by Justice
134. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

135. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1739 (Souter, J., dissenting).

137. Id. at 1739-40 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that in her
separate dissent in Nichols, Justice Ginsburg explained her reasons for joining
the majority in Custis as based on the fact that Custis involved what forum a
defendant may challenge a prior conviction's constitutionality, whereas Nichols
involved the question of whether he could do so at all. Nichols v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1921, 1937 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
139. Last year, the Court decided four forfeiture cases against the
government: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct.
1126, 1134 (1993) (limiting the interpretation of the "relation back" provision

of the forfeiture statute to allow government ownership only after there is a
forfeiture decree); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (stating
that forfeiture is not solely for remedial purposes but is used for punishments
although subject to the limits of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
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Kennedy, a five-member majority held that absent exigent
circumstances, notice and an adversary hearing are required before
the government may seize real property that is allegedly subject to
14 0
civil forfeiture under the drug laws.
Justice Kennedy rejected the government's argument that
because civil forfeiture serves a "law enforcement purpose" the
government need comply only with the Fourth Amendment when
seizing property. 14 1 He pointed out that the Court, in CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 142 had analyzed the
constitutionality of an exparte seizure of a yacht under due process
principles and not the Fourth Amendment. That the government
prevailed in Calero-Toledo was of no consequence since the yacht,
being movable, presented an "extraordinary situation" that justified
an exception to the general due process rle requiring pre143
deprivation hearing and notice.
Justice Kennedy held that whether the government's seizure of
the real property at issue in James Daniel was an "extraordinary
situation" had to be analyzed under the three-prong due process
framework of Mathews v. Eldridge.14 4 Mathews requires a court to
weigh several factors: the private interest affected by the official
action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, and the government's interest, including the
Clause); Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993) (stating that
forfeiture of property under both the civil and criminal forfeiture laws issubject
to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause); Republic Nat'l Bank of
Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 559-60 (1992) (stating that
government's quick movement of a res after winning a forfeiture judgment does
not prevent the court of appeals from entertaining an appeal by the claimant
since in rem forfeiture was designed to "expand the reach of the courts and to
furnish remedies for aggrieved parties").
140. James Daniel, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
141. Id. at 499.
142. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-Toledo, the Court held that due process
was not denied by a Puerto Rican statute, in which a leased pleasure yacht was
seized in forfeiture proceedings without prior notice. Id. at 679. The Court ruled
that seizure served a significant government purpose of permitting Puerto Rico

to assert in rem jurisdiction and the Court found that preseizure notice might
have frustrated the governmental interest. Id. at 679-80.
143. Id. at 680.
144. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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administrative burden that additional procedural requirements
14 5
would impose.
Applying those factors in James Daniel, Justice Kennedy found
that the claimant's interest in his home is of "historic and
continuing importance," even though at the time of the seizure, the
claimant was renting the home to others. 146 It is also an interest
that is greater, he emphasized, than the threatened loss of kitchen
14 7
appliances and furniture that the Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin,
had already held required a pre-deprivation hearing. Secondly,
Justice Kennedy observed that ex parte seizures create an
unacceptable risk of error, in that the government's ex parte
submission will generally not contain evidence of a claimant's
innocent ownership or any other defenses he might have to the
forfeiture. 14 8 Lastly, the government's interest, Kennedy
concluded, was not strong, and there was "no pressing need" for
proceeding without notice to the property owner. Justice Kennedy
also pointed out that the government has various less intrusive
means to protect its legitimate interests in forfeitable real property,
such as a lis pendens notice to prevent sale of the property, a
restraining order to prevent its destruction, or search and arrest
149
warrants to forestall further illegal activity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia and in part by
Justice O'Connor, labeled the majority's opinion an "ill-considered
and disruptive decision." 150 He concluded that "there is no need to
look beyond the Fourth Amendment in civil forfeiture proceedings
involving the Government because exparte seizures are 'too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
be now displaced,' ' 15 1 and lamented that "[i]t is paradoxical
145. Id. at 335.
146. James Daniel, 114 S. Ct. at 501.

147. 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) ("We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania
prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due
process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard
before chattels are taken from their possessor.").
148. James Daniel, 114 S. Ct. at 501-02.
149. Id. at 503-04.

150. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(quoting Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921)).
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indeed to hold that a criminal defendant can be temporarily
deprived of liberty on the basis of an ex parte probable cause
determination, yet respondent Good cannot be temporarily
152
deprived of property on the same basis."
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with Rehnquist
that the majority's effort to distinguish between real and personal
property was unpersuasive. She also believed that there was no
need for notice to the claimant beyond the fact of his conviction
and she found it difficult to see what good a hearing would do. 153
Justice Thomas also concluded that Good had not been denied
due process "'simply because Good did not receive preseizure
notice and an opportunity to be heard."' 154 However, Thomas
found the occasion appropriate for an expression of his broader
views about government entitlements and private property. 155
Acknowledging that he shared the majority's discomfort in regard
to "the breadth of new civil forfeiture statutes such as 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7), which subjects to forfeiture all real property that is
used, or intended to be used, in the commission, or even the
facilitation, of a federal drug offense," 156 "it may be necessary,"
he stated, "to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to
57
legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture."1
Prior to the decisions last Term and now in James Daniel, there
was more than ample reason to believe that civil forfeiture would
remain untrammeled in the government's drug war arsenal. That
belief now seems misplaced. The Court's decisions in the civil
forfeiture context are significant in that in hard times, even a
conservative Court will not necessarily embrace an "ends justifies
the means" approach.
152. Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 511-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
154. Id. at 516 (Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
155. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice

Thomas remarked that "[i]n my view, as the Court has increasingly emphasized
the creation and delineation of entitlements in recent years, it has not always
placed sufficient stress upon the protection of individuals' traditional rights in
real property." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
156. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
157. Id.(Thomas, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Of the several double jeopardy cases this Term, Department of

Revenue of Montanav. Kurth Ranch, 15 8 is the most interesting and
analytically, the most challenging. It is interesting because a five-

member majority again coalesced to thwart operation of another
governmental drug war stratagem. It is challenging because the

ingenuity of the Montana scheme required the Court, for the first
time, to decide whether a tax can violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Five years ago, in United States v. Halper,159 the Court held that
a "civil" penalty can be so severe, and so far divorced from the
costs occasioned by the conduct the penalty seeks to remedy, as to
constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. 160 In Kurth
Ranch, however, the Halperrationale did not furnish the basis for
decision. Instead, the five-member majority, in an opinion by
Justice Stevens, concluded that Montana's drug tax statute violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause because of several "unusual
features." 1 6 1
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act imposed a tax "'on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs"' that was to be
collected after all fines and forfeitures had been collected. 162 The
assessment of the tax was either ten percent of the market value of
158. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
159. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper,a medical laboratory employee filed 65
false claims for medicare reimbursement, each of which overstated the amount

reimbursable by $9, resulting in a fraud on the government of $585. Id. at 437.
The employee was also convicted of 65 counts of violating the criminal false
claims statute and was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. Id.
Subsequently, the government brought a civil action against the defendant under
the False Claims Act seeking a civil penalty of $2,000, double damages for each
violation, subjecting the defendant to a penalty of more than $130,000. Id. at
438. The Court held that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant who
already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fully be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 448-49.
160. Id. at 449-50.
161. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
162. Id.
at 1941.
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the drug as determined by the Montana Department of Revenue, or
a "specified amount depending on the drug,... whichever was
greater." 163 Proceeds were to be used for drug education
programs. 164 A taxpayer, under the Act, was under no obligation
to pay the tax until he or she had been arrested, but had to do so
within seventy-two hours of his or her arrest. The police were
authorized to fill out a dangerous diary information report and have
the taxpayer sign it; if he or she refused, the police were required to
16 5
file the report within 72 hours of the arrest.
The Kurth family began growing and selling marijuana in 1986.
Some two weeks after the Drug Tax Act took effect, Montana
police "raided the farm, arrested the Kurths, and
confiscated... the marijuana plants." 16 6 Upon commencement of
a civil forfeiture action by the county attorney, the Kurths agreed to
forfeit $18,016 in cash and various items of marijuana operation
equipment. 167 Seeking to enforce the new Drug Tax Act against
the Kurths, the Department of Revenue claimed it was entitled to
almost $900,000.168 In state administrative proceedings, the
Kurths contested the assessment. However, the proceedings were
stayed automatically when the Kurths filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.169
The bankruptcy court, relying on Halper, held that only
$181,000 could be assessed under state law but any further
assessment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 170 The district
court affirmed, holding that the Act punished the Kurths a second
time for the same criminal conduct. 17 1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
but declined to hold the tax unconstitutional on its face. 172 Instead,
163. Id.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 1941-42.
166. Id. at 1942. Six members of the Kurth family entered guilty pleas to
various drug offenses, with the parents receiving prison sentences and the
remaining four members receiving deferred sentences. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.at 1943.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit held that the state had not proven that the tax was
justified. 173 While the Kurth case was pending an appeal, the
Montana Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, held that the
Dangerous Drug Tax Act did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 174 Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with
conflicting interpretations of the Act by the federal and state
courts.
Justice Stevens concluded that Halper did not provide a
dispositive rationale for this case because Halper involved a civil
penalty, not a tax. 175 However, Justice Stevens indicated that
several of Halper's premises were germane to analysis of the tax
issue, including the premise that the Double Jeopardy Clause
affords protection to a convicted and punished defendant from
imposition of a non-remedial civil penalty, and that the label
attached by the state to a civil penalty does not necessarily
control. 176 More to the point, Justice Stevens observed, was the
Court's previous recognition that "'there comes a time in the
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it
loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the
characteristics of regulation and punishment.' 177 Justice Stevens
concluded that Montana's drug tax crossed the line between a
178
legitimate tax and punishment for several reasons.
To underscore his point, Justice Stevens stressed the distinction
between the Montana Tax and "mixed-motive" taxes that seek both
to deter a disfavored activity and to raise money:
By imposing cigarette taxes, for example, a government wants to
discourage smoking. But because the product's benefits--such as
173. Id. at 1944.

174. See Sorenson v. State Dep't of Revenue, 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
175. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944.
176. Id.
at 1945.
177. Id.
at 1946 (citation omitted).
178. Id.First, although the high rate of the tax and its obvious deterrent
purpose did not automatically render the tax as punishment, they were important
features. Id. Second, and most significant, the Montana tax "is conditioned on
the commission of a crime" and "is exacted only after the taxpayer has been
arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation ... ." Id. at
1947. Thus, "[p]ersons who have been arrested for possessing marijuana
constitute the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax." Id.
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creating employment, satisfying consumer demand, and providing
tax revenues--are regarded as outweighing the harm, the
government will allow the manufacture, sale, and use of cigarettes
as long as the manufacturers, sellers, and smokers pay high taxes
that reduce consumption and increase government revenue. These
justifications vanish when the taxed activity is completely
forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might
support such a tax could be equally well served by increasing the
79
fine imposed upon conviction. 1
Justice Stevens also observed that the Montana tax possessed
another exceptional feature: although it purports to be a property
tax, "it is levied on goods that the taxpayer neither owns nor
possesses when the tax is imposed." 180 Therefore, reasoned Justice
Stevens, "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and
that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an unmistakable
181
punitive character."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, agreed that Halper's focus
on the distinction between remedial and punitive purposes is
inappropriate in the context of a tax, but he disputed the majority's
conclusion that the characteristics of the Montana drug tax made it
"punishment. ' 182 He pointed to Justice Stevens' acknowledgment
that taxes may legitimately have the dual purpose of raising
revenue and deterring conduct and argued that just because the
conduct being deterred is already prohibited by a criminal statute
183
does not make the tax "punishment."
Rehnquist also took issue with the majority's assertion that the
Montana tax was conditioned on a criminal conviction. For him,
the statute merely recognized that a criminal prosecution is a
necessary coincidence of taxing criminal conduct. 184 Lastly,
Rehnquist observed that the statute was designed to raise revenue
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1948.

181. Id. "Taken as a whole," he concluded, "this drug tax is a concoction of
anomalies, too far-removed in crucial aspects from a standard tax assessment to
escape characterization as punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy
analysis." Id.
182. Id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1951 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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by taxing a lucrative underground business and that its tax rate is
not so out-of-step with other "sin taxes" as to justify characterizing
85
it as punishment. 1
Justice O'Connor, also dissenting, argued that Halper, which
focused on "the overwhelming disproportionality" between the
sanction and the damages caused by the wrongful conduct, was the
appropriate precedent. 18 6 But under Halper, she concluded,
Montana's tax is constitutional. 187 O'Connor emphasized that
under Halper, "the defendant must first show the absence of a
rational relationship between the amount of the sanction and the
government's non punitive objectives; the burden then shifts to the
government to justify the sanction with reference to the particular
case." 18 8 Justice O'Connor was also disturbed that the majority's
decision invalidates other numerous state drug taxes, which she
believed were legitimate attempts to obtain recompense for the
18 9
high costs of drug law enforcement.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also dissented. As is
not infrequently the case with Justice Scalia, he again argued for
overruling prior precedent, insisting that once again the majority
had departed from the constitutional text. This time, it was Halper
that should be overruled because the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits only multiple prosecutions--not multiple punishments. 19 0
Justice Scalia also believed that the majority had based its
decision on the assumption that the proceeding initiated to collect
185. Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further noted
that this tax should not be considered arbitrary or shocking based upon the
traditional deference given to the states in matters of taxation and that a
significant number of illegal drug traffickers will escape the taxation. Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
noted that under Halper, "it will be the 'rare case' in which the litigant will
succeed in satisfying the first prong of the constitutional analysis." Id. at 1955
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). "'To be put in jeopardy' Scalia argued,
"does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by it terms this provision [the
Double Jeopardy Clause] prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple
prosecutions." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the tax was a criminal prosecution. 19 1 Although he conceded that
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez192 and United States v. Ward 193
accept that civil proceedings which impose a sanction so severe as
to constitute "punishment" may be treated as a criminal
prosecution for double jeopardy purposes, Scalia argued that the
Kennedy-Ward test sets such a high standard for a civil sanction to
194
qualify as "punishment," that the Montana tax does not qualify.
The "successive prosecution" issue did arise in two other cases,
Schiro v. Farley,19 5 and Caspariv. Bohlen. 19 6 Both were federal
habeas corpus challenges to state court convictions; Schiro was
decided on the merits, but Caspari ran afoul of the "new rule"
19 7
principle espoused in Teague v. Lane.
In Schiro, the defendant was convicted of murdering a young
woman while committing the crime of rape. He had been charged
with three counts of murder: "knowingly" killing his victim, killing
her while committing rape, and killing her while committing
deviant conduct. 19 8 The jury rejected the defendant's insanity
defense but returned a verdict only as to the count of killing while
committing rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury
recommended against the death penalty, but the trial judge rejected
that recommendation. 19 9 The trial court reasoned that the state
effectively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
2 00
intentionally killed the young woman while committing a rape.
191. Id. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
193. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
194. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
196. 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994).
197. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In Teague, the Court announced the general rule
of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review. Id. at 307. However, there are
two exceptions where a new rule should be applied retroactively. "First, a new
rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe."' Id. (citation omitted). "Second, a new rule [will] be applied
retroactively if it requires the observance of 'those procedures that.., are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty!.... Id. (citation omitted).
198. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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The defendant argued that the jury had acquitted him of the
intentional murder count, and that the trial judge's subsequent
imposition of the death penalty constituted double jeopardy. The
1
Seventh Circuit rejected his claim. 20
By a seven-to-two majority, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's ruling. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
held that the sentencing phase of a single capital proceeding cannot
be treated as a "successive prosecution" for double jeopardy
purposes. 2 02 Since the Court had held previously that a second
sentencing proceeding does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, "we fail to see how an initial sentencing proceeding could
do so," she stated. 203
Justice O'Connor distinguished Bullington v. Missouri204 from
the instant case. In Bullington, the Court had held that a defendant
sentenced to life imprisonment, following a trial-like capital
sentencing proceeding, is protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause
against imposition of the death penalty if he obtains a reversal of
his conviction and is retried and reconvicted. 2 05 Justice O'Connor
explained that the Court, in Bullington, created a narrow exception
to the general principle because-the capital sentencing proceeding
was deemed tantamount to a separate trial on the issue of
punishment. 206 In contrast to Bullington, she pointed out, the state
in Schiro's case did not subject him to a second death penalty
proceeding but merely conducted a single sentencing proceeding in
the course of a single prosecution. 207 The state was entitled to this
"'one fair opportunity"' to prosecute Schiro. 20 8
Schiro's collateral estoppel claim also proved unsuccessful. The
majority held that Schiro had failed to carry his threshold burden of
demonstrating that the jury in his case necessarily acquitted him of
201. Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962, 971 (7th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom.
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
202. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789.
203. Id.
204. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
205. Id. at 446.
206. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 790.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citation omitted).
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intentional murder during the guilt-innocence phase. 209 Justice
O'Connor noted that "[t]he jury was not instructed to return
verdicts on all the counts submitted to it, nor was it instructed to
decide the counts in any particular order."' 2 10 Even though an
intent to kill is not necessary to convict a defendant of felony
murder, Schiro's attempt to draw meaning from the jury's verdict
on that offense but not on the intentional murder count was
frustrated by the trial court's instruction that the state must prove
2 11
an intentional killing to convict Schiro of murder.
Justice Blackmun dissented, maintaining that Bullington applied
and that the jury's failure to convict the defendant of intentional
murder amounted to an implied acquittal that precluded a death
sentence on the basis of an intentional-murder aggravating
circumstance. 2 12 Justice Stevens also dissented in an opinion
joined by Justice Blackmun. Stevens believed that the jury
necessarily decided that the defendant had not committed
intentional murder at both the guilt-innocence phase and the
sentencing hearing. 2 13 "[A]n egregious violation of the... Double
Jeopardy Clause" occurred, he insisted, when the trial judge based
2 14
Schiro's death sentence on a factor that the jury had rejected.
The "successive prosecution" issue also arose in Caspari. In
Caspari, the defendant sought to have the Court answer, in the
affirmative, a question that remained after Bullington: "whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a state from twice subjecting a
2 15 It
defendant to a noncapitalsentence enhancement proceeding."
is a question that will have to be resolved in another case.
In an opinion for an eight-member majority, Justice O'Connor
rejected the court of appeals' ruling that Missouri's persistent209. Id.
210. Id. at 791.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 792-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted that
the defendant's death sentence warranted vacation because under the essential
holding of Bullington, the defendant's death sentence proceeding "can
constitute a 'jeopardy' under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 793
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 794-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Caspari,114 S. Ct. at 951.
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offender sentence enhancement procedure has protections similar
2 16
to those in the capital sentencing hearing in Bullington.
O'Connor, as well, rejected the court of appeals' contention that it
was a "short step" to apply the same double jeopardy protections to
a noncapital sentencing proceeding as the Court had done in a
capital sentencing hearing. 2 17 The court of appeals erred because it
misapplied the "new rule" requirement of Teague; a requirement
2 18
that is a threshold issue in habeas corpus.
Justice O'Connor set forth the necessary steps that a federal court
must follow when faced with a Teague issue. First, the court must
2 19
determine the date that the petitioner's conviction became final.
Second, the court must canvass the state of the law at the time the
petitioner's conviction became final and determine whether a state
court "'would have felt compelled by existing precedent to
conclude"' that the rule sought by the petitioner was required by
the Constitution. 220 Third, if it is a new rule, then the court should
determine whether either of Teague's two exceptions would
21
apply.2
The majority concluded that Bullington did in fact establish a
new rule. Justice O'Connor noted that traditionally, sentencing has
been thought not to implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because
'a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality
that attend an acquittal.' 222 However, the cases on which the
petitioner based his argument, Bullington and Arizona v.
Rumsey, 223 were both capital cases. While these cases attached
double jeopardy consequences to a sentencing determination,
Justice O'Connor explained that the reasoning which led to those
results were based on the "unique circumstances of... capital
216. Id. at 957.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 953.
220. Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
221. Caspari,114 S. Ct. at 953.
222. Id. at 954 (citation omitted).
223. 467 U.S. 203 (1984). The Court held that double jeopardy protections
apply where respondent was initially sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 212.
The Court ruled that this constituted an acquittal of the death penalty and the
state could not then sentence respondent to death on his murder charge. Id.
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sentencing." 224 Justice O'Connor noted that other decisions, such
as Strickland v. Washington225 and Pennsylvania v.
Goldhammer,2 26 "strongly suggested that Bullington was limited
to capital sentencing." 227 Therefore, she concluded, "a reasonable
jurist reviewing our precedents at the time respondent's conviction
and sentence became final would not have considered the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital
sentencing proceeding to be dictated by our precedents. 22 8
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. He believed that the state
had forfeited the Teague issue and he criticized the majority for
forgiving waivers by the state, as was done in Schiro, while being
more strict with habeas petitioners. 229 On the merits, Stevens had
"no hesitation"' in concluding that double jeopardy protection
230
applied to Missouri's sentence enhancement.
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. ReasonableDoubt
Four years ago, in Cage v. Louisiana,2 3 1 the Court held that a
judge's reasonable doubt charge containing the phrases "moral
certainty," "actual substantial doubt," and "grave uncertainty," did
not accurately apprise the jury of the burden of proof required, as a
matter of due process,232 required under In re TVinship.233 A year
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Caspari,114 S. Ct. at 954.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
474 U.S. 28 (1985).
Caspari,114 S. Ct. at 955.
Id.

229. Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id.at 958 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
232. Id. at 40-41 ("It is plain to us that the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as
they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.").
233. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that juveniles, like adults, are
entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violating
criminal laws).
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later, in Estelle v. McGuire,234 Cage's potential was weakened
somewhat by the Court's holding that the standard for reviewing a
challenged jury instruction is not whether the instruction could
have been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there
2 3 5 This
is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury did so apply it.
Term, the Court, in Victor v. Nebraska,236 again grappled with the
definition of "reasonable doubt" in jury instructions. In Victor, the
Court appears to have further diluted Cage.
Victor was consolidated for argument with Sandoval v.
California; and in both cases, the jury instructions contained
language condemned in Cage. The Nebraska and California
Supreme Courts found Cage distinguishable and affirmed the
convictions of the defendants, both of whom had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death.2 37
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor first addressed
Sandoval, in which the jury was instructed that reasonable doubt
"'is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt.' 238 Instead, the judge charged,
reasonable doubt "'is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds
of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge.' 2 39
Justice O'Connor traced this charge to one given in 1850 by
Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts. At that time, the phrases
"moral evidence" and "moral certainty" were intended to convey
234.
235.
236.
237.

502 U.S. 62 (1991).
Id. at 73 n.4.
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
See People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 878 (Cal. 1992) ("Despite use of

the term 'moral certainty' in [jury instruction] No. 2.90, the instruction does not
suffer from the flaws condemned in Cage v. Louisiana...."), af'd sub nom.
Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994); State v. Victor, 494 N.W.2d 565,
569 (Neb. 1993) (finding defendant's argument that reasonable doubt
instruction was unconstitutional without merit), aff'd sub nom. Victor v.
Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
238. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244 (citation omitted).
239. Id. (citation omitted).
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the highest level of certainty that someone can expect to reach in a
matter involving things human or "moral." She noted that
subsequent cases made clear that "proof to a moral certainty" was a
synonym for "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 24 0 Also, she
observed, modem dictionaries that define "moral evidence" do so
ina manner consistent with its original meaning.
In light of this background Justice O'Connor, writing here for the
entire Court, rejected Sandoval's claim that the jury in his case was
left to base its verdict on something other than the evidence
presented or something less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.24 1 She conceded that "moral certainty is ambiguous in the
abstract, '242 but pointed out that other directions in the challenged
instruction focused the jury on the facts of the case and lent content
to the phrase.24 3 Because the jury was so focused, Justice
O'Connor maintained, Cage was distinguishable since the Court in
Cage found that "the jurors were simply told that they had to be
morally certain of the defendant's guilt; there was nothing else in
' 2 44
the instruction to lend meaning to the phrase. "
The Court's concern with the inclusion of "moral certainty" was
again expressed. Justice O'Connor observed that in a different
case, jurors faced with less explicit instructions than that given to
Sandoval's jury might interpret that phrase or "moral evidence" as
something less than reasonable certainty. Accordingly, she
recommended against use of such terms in the future.
The Court did not remain unanimous, however, when it turned
its attention to the jury charge in Victor. In that case the Nebraska
trial judge instructed that:
240. Id.at 1246.
241. Id.at 1247.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1246. The Court found that:
The jury was told that 'everything relating to human affairs, and
depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt'-in other words, that absolute certainty is unattainable in matters
relating to human affairs. Moral evidence in this sense, can only mean
empirical evidence offered to prove such matters-the proof introduced at
trial.
Id.
244. Id. at 1248.
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'Reasonable doubt' is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable
and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important
transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the
represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon. It is such
a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial
consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, to
a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time,
absolute or mathematical certainty is not required.... You may
find an accused guilty upon the strong probabilitiesof the case,

provided such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any
doubt of his guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an
actual and substantialdoubt arising from the evidence, from the
facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of
evidence on the part of the state, as distinguished from mere
possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture. 245
Only a bare majority agreed with most of Justice O'Connor's
opinion as to this charge. She concluded that the "substantial
doubt" language, though "somewhat problematic," was adequately
clarified by the rest of the charge. The context made clear that
"substantial doubt" was intended to distinguish "fanciful"
conjecture and not to refer to the "magnitude of doubt," which,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged, "could imply a doubt greater than
required for acquittal under Winship.' '24 6 What made this
instruction's use of "substantial doubt" different from that in Cage
is the latter's lack of any accompanying clarification.
Similarly, Justice O'Connor concluded, the "moral certainty"
language included in the charge was, as in Sandoval, adequately
clarified by the instructions surrounding it. These surrounding
instructions, she noted, explained that a doubt that would preclude
a "moral certainty" was "a doubt that would cause a reasonable
person to hesitate to act." 24 7 Lastly, the majority held that the
reference to "strong probabilities" in the jury instruction did not
violate due process because "inthe same sentence, the instruction
245. Id. at 1249.
246. Id. at 1250.

247. Id. at 1250-5 1. Justice O'Connor explained that "a juror morally certain

of a fact would not hesitate to rely on it; and such a fact can fairly be said to
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1251.
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informs the jury that the probabilities must be strong enough to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 248
Concurring, Justice Kennedy observed that "[i]t was
commendable for Chief Justice Shaw to pen an instruction that
survived more than a century, but... what once might have made
sense to jurors has long since become archaic."'249 He found
"moral evidence," as used in Sandoval, even more troubling than
"moral certainty." He recommended that both be omitted in the
future. 2 5 0

Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, expressed disapproval of the Nebraska judge's
"hesitation to act" language and his circular language about the
"strong probabilities of the case."'2 5 1 She recommended use of the
Federal Judicial Center's proposed definition of reasonable doubt
'2 52
which she believed is "clear, straightforward, and accurate."

248. Id.
249. Id. at 1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy found "moral
evidence," as used in Sandoval, even more troubling than "moral certainty" and
he recommended that both be omitted in the future. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
250. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Judicial Center's charge
reads as follows:
The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases,
where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more
likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government's proof must
be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this
world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law
does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on
your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on
the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty,
you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
FJC, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 21 (1987).
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, dissented in part,
arguing that the instruction given in Victor was not significantly
253
different from the instruction that was struck down in Cage.
It is reasonable to expect that trial judges will accept the
Supreme Court's recommendation that phrases such as "moral
certainty" and "moral evidence" be avoided. It has been my
experience, however, that the word does not filter down so easily,
whether it be that of the Supreme Court or of courts closer to
home. Judges all too often utilize language in their instructions that
appellate courts have previously condemned, thereby causing
unnecessary reversals. In most instances, I believe continued use
results from a trial judge's ignorance or sloppiness. In some cases,
however, I believe there is present a degree of willfulness.
The decision in Victor, I fear, will not change this. Victor has
already been perceived by at least one high state court as a
retrenchment from Cage. In State v. Smith,2 54 the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed a conviction where "moral certainty" was
included in the trial judge's charge. The court observed that "while
Cage focused on the presence of the suspect terms in the
instruction, the Victor court considered the relationship of the
terms to the instruction as a whole to determine whether the jurors
were reasonably likely to have misapplied the instruction. '2 55 This
conclusion may hold true in the future.
B. Insanity
In Shannon v. United States,25 6 the defendant, a convicted felon,
was stopped by a police officer on a street in Tupelo, Mississippi
and was asked to accompany the officer to the station house to
speak with a detective. After telling the officer that he did not want
to live anymore, the defendant walked across the street, pulled a
pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest. 257
253. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1254 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
254. 637 So. 2d 398 (La. 1994).
255. Id. at 403.
256. 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
257. Id. at 2423.
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The defendant survived, perhaps unhappily, to face prosecution
for unlawfully possessing a firearm by a felon. He invoked the
insanity defense at trial and requested that the jury be told that a
"not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict would result in his
involuntary commitment. 2 58 The trial court refused and instructed
the jury to apply the law notwithstanding the consequences and to
ignore the defendant's punishment in its deliberations. 259 The
defendant was found guilty and on appeal the Fifth Circuit upheld
260
the trial judge's refusal to charge as the defense requested.
Writing for a seven-to-two majority, Justice Thomas held that in
general a federal jury "does not require an instruction concerning
the consequences of an NGI [not guilty by reason of insanity]
verdict, and that such an instruction is not to be given as a matter
of general practice.. .. ,261 Such an instruction is not required
either by the 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act [hereinafter
IDRA] 262 or as a matter of general federal practice. The Court
noted that such an instruction would be appropriate only in limited
circumstances, such as the injection into the trial of an inaccurate
2 63
statement as to the consequences of an NGI verdict.
Justice Thomas first reviewed the history of IDRA and
developments subsequent to its enactment. Before the Act was
passed by Congress in 1984, there had been no NGI verdict in the
federal courts. 2 64 With the exception of the District of Columbia,

258. Id.

259. Id. The trial judge specifically instructed the jury "'to apply the law as

[instructed] regardless of the consequence,"' and that "'punishment... should
not enter your consideration or discussion."' Id. (citation omitted).
260. See United States v.Shannon, 981 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114
S.Ct.2419 (1994).
261. Shannon, 114 S.Ct.at 2428.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1984).
263. See Shannon, 114 S.Ct. at 2428; see also United States v.Fisher, 10
F.3d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that instruction to the jury concerning the
consequences of a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict should be made "in
the sound discretion of the trial judge").
264. Shannon, 114 S.Ct.at 2422.
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there was no commitment procedure for federal defendants
265
acquitted by reason of insanity.
Justice Thomas explained that Congress undertook a
"comprehensive overhaul" of the insanity defense, which was
prompted in part by the insanity acquittal of John Hinckley for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. 266 The statute,
IDRA, codified the insanity defense and established a
comprehensive civil commitment procedure for defendants found
267
not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Act's only mention of jury instructions is its list of the three
possible verdicts a jury may return when the insanity defense is
raised. 2 68 The statutory text, Justice Thomas noted, "gives no
indication that jurors are to be instructed regarding the
consequences of an NGI verdict" and thus provides no support for
269
the defendant's argument that such instruction is required.
Shannon also argued that Congress intended to copy the courtprescribed procedures followed in the District of Columbia under a
local statute. Justice Thomas rejected this argument, stating that
"although Congress may have had the D.C. law in mind when it
passed the IDRA," the two statutes have enough significant
differences, including issues such as burden of proof, release
standards, and the standard for insanity, to refute Shannon's
27 0
argument that Congress "borrowed" the local law's terms.
Thomas noted also that the D.C. rule on jury instructions in
insanity cases is not even a statutory matter; therefore, the rule of
27 1
construction pressed by Shannon was inapplicable.
265. Id. Federal courts generally disapproved telling juries about the

consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity; partly because those
consequences were uncertain, and partly because such an instruction would be
out of step with the general rule that a verdict should be based strictly on the
evidence. Id. at 2422-23.
266. Id. at 2423.
267. 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (1984).
268. 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b). Section 4242(b) states in pertinent part that: "The
jury shall be instructed to find ... the defendant (1) guilty; (2) not guilty; or (3)
not guilty by reason of insanity." Id.
269. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2425.
270. Id. at 2425-26.
271. Id. at 2426 n.8.
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Justice Thomas also refused to invoke the Court's supervisory
power to require instructions on the consequences of an NGI
verdict. He rejected Shannon's argument that an instruction is
needed to counter the mistaken impression jurors might have that
272
an insanity acquittee will be immediately released into society.
He doubted that many jurors are so misinformed, particularly in the
aftermath of John Hinckley. 273 Thomas also noted that the
instructions given to the jury instructed them to ignore such
considerations and that the potential for releasing a dangerous
person is no more difficult to ignore when it results from an
insanity acquittal than when it results from a failure of the
government "to meet its burden of proof at trial." 2 74
Justice Thomas observed further that the requested instruction
could be counterproductive and actually be to the defendant's
disadvantage. The IDRA does not necessarily ensure that an
insanity acquittee will be in custody very long, so an accurate
instruction about the commitment procedure would not provide
275
much reassurance.
Justice Thomas also believed that the logic of Shannon's
position had no obvious stopping place. Jurors may come to their
task misinformed on other matters, including parole or the
sentences for lesser included offenses. Courts, he argued, would be
hard pressed to resist requests for instructions on these issues, if
276
Shannon were granted his request.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented, stating
that "[a] rule that has minimized the risk of injustice for almost 40
years should not be abandoned without good reason."'277 He
272. Id. at 2427.
273. Id. at 2427 n.10.
274. Id. at 2427.

275. Id. Justice Thomas noted that "[i]nstead of encouraging a juror to return
an NGI verdict, as Shannon predicts, such information might have the opposite
effect - that is,a juror might vote to convict in order to eliminate the possibility
that a dangerous defendant could be released after 40 days or less." Id. at 242728. Whether the instruction would help or hurt a defendant, an "inevitable
result ... would be to draw the jury's attention toward the very thing-the
possible consequences of its verdict-it should ignore." Id. at 2428.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2428-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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pointed out that in Lyles v. United States,27 8 the D.C. Circuit, en
banc, was deciding a case under the District of Columbia's then
unique automatic commitment. In an opinion co-authored by the
then Judge Warren Burger, the court explained that despite the
doctrine "that the jury has no concern with the consequences of a
verdict. .. [w]e think that doctrine does not apply in the problem
before us."'279 Now that IDRA established a civil commitment
process for the entire federal system, the basis for the Lyles holding
was now applicable to all federal courts, Stevens argued. 280 It was
clear to Stevens that "[tihe Act's legislative history unmistakably
demonstrates that the Act's sponsors assumed that the Lyles
precedent would thereafter be followed nationwide." 2 8 1
Justice Stevens also disputed the majority's perception that
contemporary jurors are more familiar with the consequences of an
NGI verdict than they were in 1957 when Lyles was decided. He
referred to a very recent study which concluded that "'the public
overestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are released
upon acquittal and underestimates the extent to which they are
hospitalized as well as the length of confinement of insanity
acquittees who are sent to mental hospitals.' 2 82 Justice Stevens
noted further that a growing number of states that have considered
the question endorse the commitment instruction as does the
American Bar Association. 283
On the issue of what jurors know, I believe that Justice Stevens
has the better of the argument. I doubt very much whether the
average person has much recollection of the Hinckley case and the
manner in which it was resolved. If a goodly number of my own
students do not even know who John Hinckley is, I would be
hesitant to assume that the general public's knowledge is in greater
estate. However, on the statutory history question, the majority
may not be unreasonable in its view that Congress did not clearly
278.
(1958).
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961
Id. at 728.
Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Shannon, 114 S.Ct. at 2431 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intend to carry into IDRA the judicial gloss which Lyles put on the
local statute in 1957.
VI. GUILTY KNOWLEDGE
This Term also saw an unusual number of criminal intent issues.
In three cases, the Court had to construe several federal criminal
statutes with regard to the level of knowledge required to support a
conviction.
In Ratzlaf v. United States,284 the Court held that in order to
convict a defendant of "willfully" structuring a currency
transaction for the purpose of avoiding a financial institution's
requirement to file a Currency Transaction Report, the government
must prove that the defendant acted with the knowledge that his or
her conduct was unlawful. 285
In Staples v. United States,286 the Court held that under the
National Firearms Act, the government had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the weapon he possessed
had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition
287
of a machine gun.
In Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States,2 88 the Court held
that the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act 289 did not
require the government to prove that the defendant had specific
knowledge that an item qualify as drug paraphernalia, but rather
that the defendant knew the items being sold were likely to be used
with drugs.

29 0

Of the three cases, Ratzlaf is arguably the most significant and
surprising, especially in light of the facts of the case. Ratzlaf ran up
a debt of $160,000 at the High Sierra Casino in Reno and was
284. 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994).
285. Id. at 663. The Court stated that it was not sufficient that the defendant's
purpose was to circumvent a bank's reporting requirement. Id.
286. 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
287. Id. at 1804.
288. 114 S. Ct. 1747 (1994).
is unlawful for
289. 21 U.S.C. § 857(a). Section 857(a) provides that "[i]t
any person (1) to make use of the services of the Postal Service or other
interstate conveyance as part of a scheme to sell drug paraphernalia." Id.
290. Posters 'N' Things, Ltd, 114 S. Ct. at 1751.
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given a week to pay up. 29 1 He subsequently appeared at the casino
with $100,000 but a casino official told him that all transactions
involving more than $10,000 in cash had to be reported to state
authorities. However, the official also informed him that the casino
could accept a cashier's check for the full amount without having
to report it. Ratzlaf was further informed that banks, as well, are
required to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000.
Ensconced in a limousine provided by the casino, and
accompanied by a casino employee, Ratzlaf visited a number of
banks, each time buying a cashier's check for less than $10,000,
292
which he then delivered to the casino.
Ratzlaf was indicted for "structuring transactions to evade the
banks' obligation to report cash transactions" in excess of
$10,000,293 in violation of 31 U.S.C. § § 5324(3)294 and
5322(a). 2 95 The trial judge charged the jury that the government
had to prove Ratzlaf knew of the banks' reporting obligation and
his attempt to evade that obligation but that the government did not
296
have to prove that Ratzlaf knew the structuring was unlawful.
On appeal, Ratzlaf argued that for him to be convicted of "willful"
conduct, "the Government must prove he was aware of the
'297
illegality of the 'structuring' in which he engaged."
Writing for a bare majority, Justice Ginsburg agreed with
Ratzlaf's argument. She stated that the willfulness requirement in
section 5322(a) is not meaningless. 298 Justice Ginsburg explained
291.
292.
293.
294.

Ratzlaf 114 S. Ct. at 657.
Id.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 5324(3) (1992). Section 5324(3) provides: "No person shall

for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of Section 5313(a) with
respect to such transaction --.

.

. (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt

to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic
financial institutions." Id.
295. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1992). Section 5322(a) reads: "A person willfully
violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this
subchapter ...shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not
more than five years, or both." Id.
296. Ratzlaf 114 S.Ct. at 657.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 659.
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that section 5322(a) is used to criminalize other provisions of the
regulatory scheme apart from the anti-structuring provision, and
that in those instances, courts have consistently read it "to require
both 'knowledge of the reporting requirement' and a 'specific
intent to commit the crime,' i.e., 'a purpose to disobey the
99
law."' 2
The government argued that structuring cash transactions is not
the sort of thing a person does innocently and that it is therefore
reasonable to impose criminal liability on a structurer without
proving that he knew structuring to be illegal. 300 Justice Ginsburg
replied that "currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious" and
gave as examples persons who wish to prevent banks from filing
reports to deflect IRS audits or to hide assets from former
spouses. 30 1 Finally, Justice Ginsburg did not believe that in so
construing the statute, the majority was abandoning the principle
' 302
that "ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal charge."
Justice Blackmun dissented and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas--unusual bedfellows
for him. He argued that the majority's reasoning is not justified by
the statutory text or consistent with precedent 303 and that it further
"largely nullifies the effect" of the anti-structuring provision by
"mak[ing] prosecution for structuring difficult or impossible in
most cases."' 304 Justice Blackmun did not believe that a less
stringent willfulness element, embraced by the majority, would be
likely to ensnare innocent people. 305 "As a result of today's

299. Id.
300. Id. at 660. The government argued "that § 5324 violators, by their very
conduct, exhibit a purpose to do wrong, which suffices to show 'willfulness.'"
Id.
301. Id. at 660-61.

302. Id. at 663. Justice Ginsburg maintained that if anything, it is Congress
who has deviated from the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense to a
criminal charge. Id.
303. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
304. Id. at 669-70 (Blackmun, J.,
J.,
dissenting).
Justice Blackmun maintained that
305. Id. (Blackmun,
"[p]etitioner Ratzlaf, obviously not a person of limited intelligence, was
anything but uncomprehending as he traveled from bank to bank converting his
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decision," he stated, "Waldemar Ratzlaf--to use an old phrase--will
' 3 06
be 'laughing all the way to the bank.'
A similar issue of criminal intent arose in the Staples case. In
Staples, federal agents seized an AR-15 assault rifle during a
search of the defendant's home. 307 The gun appeared to be a semiautomatic, civilian counterpart of the military's fully automatic M16 rifle. 308 However, when the agents test-fired it, they found it to
qualify as a "machinegun" since it fired automatically and not
semiautomatically 3 09 and was thus in violation of the registration
requirement under the National Firearms Act.3 10 At trial, Staples
requested a jury instruction that the statute requires proof beyond a
3 11
reasonable doubt that he knew the gun would fire automatically.
The trial court denied his request and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Justice Thomas, writing for himself and four other members of
the Court, observed that the concept of mens rea is a rule and not
an exception to our criminal jurisprudence. 3 12 Thus, "some
indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to
dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime."'3 13 Justice
Thomas rejected the government's argument that mens rea does
not apply since this case falls into a line of cases termed "public
welfare" or "regulatory" offenses whereby strict criminal liability
is imposed regardless of the defendant's knowledge of
illegality. 3 14 In rejecting the government's position, Thomas relied
on Liparota v. United States,3 15 in which the Court held that food
bag of cash to cashier's checks in $9,500 bundles." Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
306. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
307. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1968). The Act also includes within the term
"firearms" a machinegun and further defines a machinegun as "any weapon

which shoots... or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically, more than
one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26
U.S.C. § 5845(b) (1968).
311. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.

312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 1797.
Id.
Id.
471 U.S. 419 (1985).
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stamps are not of such character as to permit dispensing with the
mens rea requirement that a defendant knew the food stamps he
possessed were unauthorized. 3 16 Liparota, Justice Thomas
believed, was more applicable than cases such as United States v.
Balint3 17 in which the Court held that the Narcotic Act of 1914
required only proof that a defendant knew he was selling drugs, not
that he knew the specific items he sold were actually "narcotics"
3 18
within the meaning of the Act.
Justice Thomas also rejected the government's reliance on
United States v. Freed,3 19 in which the Court held that, like the
narcotics involved in Balint, the National Firearms Act does not
require proof that a defendant knew the hand grenades he
possessed were unregistered. 320 Thomas accused the government
of "glossing over the distinction between grenades and guns," and
"ignor[ing] the particular care we have taken to avoid construing a
statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would
32 1
'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.'
While firearms are subject to some comprehensive regulation,
Thomas pointed out, so were the food stamps in Liparota.322 That
guns are potentially dangerous does not, by itself, necessarily alert
a person that owning one is probably illegal.

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 433.
258 U.S. 250 (1922).
Id. at 254.
401 U.S. 601 (1971).
Id. at 609. Justice Thomas, in Staples, stated that Freeddoes not address

the issue presented in Staples. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1799. Freed only concerned
the issue of whether the Act required "proof of knowledge that a firearm is
unregistered." Id. The issue in Staples was whether the Act "requires the
defendant to know of the features that make his weapon a statutory firearm." Id.
Justice Thomas explained that the two concepts could espouse two different
mental states. Id.

321. Id. at 1799 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas acknowledged that the
contrast between hand grenades and guns "is not as stark" as that between hand
grenades and food stamps, but "the fact remains that there is a long tradition of
widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country. Such a
tradition did not apply to the possession of hand grenades in Freed or to the
selling of dangerous drugs that we considered in Balint." Id.
322. Id.
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VII. RETROACTIVITY
In Gerstein v. Pugh,323 the Court determined that the Fourth
Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint of liberty after a
warrantless arrest. 324 In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,32 5 the

Court held that a delay of more than forty-eight hours without a
judicial determination of probable cause renders a warrantless
arrest presumptively unconstitutional and places upon the state the
burden of showing that the delay is reasonable. 326 This Term, in
Powell v. Nevada,327 the Court held that McLaughlin is to be

applied retroactively to all cases not yet final at the time
328
McLaughlin was decided.

Powell was arrested for child abuse of his girlfriend's four-yearold daughter. Four days elapsed before a magistrate found probable
cause to hold him for a preliminary hearing and he was not
personally brought before a magistrate until ten days had passed.
By that time, the little girl had died and Powell made incriminating
statements. 32 9 The Nevada Supreme Court held that McLaughlin
330
did not apply because it was decided after Powell's arrest.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg held that Griffith v.
Kentucky,33 1 which held that "a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases,
323. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
324. Id. at 124-25. ("Whatever procedure a State may adopt, it must provide
a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any
significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a
judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.").
325. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
326. Id. at 56. The Court, interpreting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
noted that a particular case will not withstand constitutional scrutiny simply
because a probable cause determination is provided within forty-eight hours. Id.
The test will be whether the arrested individual can prove that the delay in the
hearing was unreasonable. Id.
327. 114 S.Ct. 1280 (1994).
328. Id. at 1283.
329. Id. at 1282.

330. See State v. Powell, 838 P.2d 921, 924 (Nev. 1992) (per curiam).
331. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final ...

-332

applies because Powell's conviction was not final when
333
McLaughlin was announced.
However, the retroactivity issues were not what divided the
Court. The far more difficult issue was the remedy for a
McLaughlin violation. The Court did not decide this issue and
remanded it to the Nevada Supreme Court because that court had
not ruled on an applicable remedy. 334 Justice Thomas, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the decision to remand on
the ground that a statement made by an arrestee after the fortyeight hour limit is not a "product" of a McLaughlin violation
unless "a proper hearing at or before the 48 hour mark would have
335
resulted in a finding of no probable cause.",
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on this issue,
consistent with Justice Thomas. In State v. Tucker,3 36 the court
noted that it had never followed the Supreme Court's decision in
Mallory v. United States3 37 since Mallory was based on the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers. The New Jersey Supreme
Court had held, instead, that arraignment delay was but one factor
bearing on the voluntariness of a statement. 33 8 The New Jersey
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's determination that
the defendant would have remained in lawful custody if a probable
cause hearing had been timely held. 339 Consequently, because the
defendant's statements were voluntary, the delay in affording him a
probable cause determination did not taint his statements.
I think it unlikely that, if called upon to resolve the question, the
Court will take a different approach. In recent years, the Court has
not been expansive in its rulings on "poisoned fruits." Furthermore,
the remedy of suppression may be deemed too severe when the
triggering violation is delay in arraignment. Finally, the Court's
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.at 328.
Powell, 114 S. Ct. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
645 A.2d 111 (N.J. 1993).
345 U.S. 449 (1957).
Tucker, 645 A.2d at 117.
Id. at 118.
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rejection of a twenty-four hour limitation in McLaughlin, which
most lower courts deemed an appropriate boundary for arraignment
delay, signaled a rather tepid desire on the Court's part to affect
state and local practices that have long subjected arrestees to
34 0
arraignment delay.
VIII. EVIDENCE/STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST
In Williamson v. United States,34 1 the Court surprised more than
a few when it held that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), 342 the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, does not
allow for admission of non-self-inculpatory portions of a third
person's out-of-court confession, even when the statements are part
of a narrative whose overall thrust is self-inculpatory. 34 3 This case
ultimately turned on the meaning of the word "statement."
Reginald Harris, stopped in his rental car by a deputy sheriff for
reckless driving, consented to a search of his car, in which nineteen
kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk were discovered.
Harris, then arrested, was informed that any cooperation may be
helpful to him. He was then interviewed by a DEA agent at which
time Harris admitted that it was a Cuban who gave him the cocaine
for delivery. However, when the agent proposed a controlled
340. See William E. Hellerstein, The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments:
The Supreme Court's Major Search and Seizure, Interrogation,and Criminal
Jury Selection Decisions During the 1990 Term, 9 TOURO L. REV. 39, 61-63

(1992).
341. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
342. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Rule 804(b)(3) states:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Id.
343. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
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delivery, Harris changed his story, admitted to working for
Williamson, and explained that a controlled delivery would be
3 44
fiuitless because Williamson was aware of his arrest.
At Williamson's trial, Harris invoked the Fifth Amendment and,
despite a grant of use immunity, refused to testify. 345 The trial
judge, citing Rule 804(b)(3), ruled that Harris' statements were
admissible since they were made against Harris' penal interest;
Harris was unavailable and there were sufficient corroborating
circumstances to ensure their trustworthiness. 346 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed Williamson's conviction without opinion. 347
Justice O'Connor wrote the main opinion and chose to give the
word "statement" espoused in Rule 804(b)(3) a narrow reading
because the principle behind the rule dictated a conservative
approach. 34 8 The principle, she pointed out, is the "commonsense
notion that reasonable people, even [those] who are not especially
honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they
believe them to be true.",349 Justice O'Connor also stated that
"[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory
statement does not make more credible the statement's non-selfinculpatory parts." 3 50 Nor does it make the neutral statements
35 1
more reliable.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that Harris' statement was mixed,
and those portions that inculpated Williamson tended to minimize
Harris' own role in the conspiracy. 352 Also, she noted, the changes
353
in Harris' story cast doubt on his collateral statements.

344. Id. at 2433.
345. Id. at 2434.
346. Id.
347. United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (1 th Cir. 1992), aff'd 114
S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
348. Williamson, 114 S. Ct at 2435.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. ("One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with
truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-

inculpatory nature.").
352. Id. at 2435.
353. Id.Justice O'Connor reasoned that:
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Therefore, she concluded, a trial court "may not just
assume... that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of
,,354
a fuller confession ....
Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Kennedy's view that the
Advisory Committee Notes to the rule dictated the broader reading
of "statement." She did not read the notes to clearly indicate that
the committee intended to allow the admission of out-of-court
statements that are not directly inculpatory. 355 Justice O'Connor
also observed that even under her narrow reading of the rule, there
would be circumstances in which the rule would render admissible
statements inculpating another. But whether a statement is self356
inculpatory could be determined only by viewing it in context.
Justice Scalia concurred, primarily to dispute Justice Kennedy's
concern that the majority's narrow reading of "statement"
eviscerates the hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest.3 57 He put forth a number of hypotheticals in support of
his position that the mere fact that a third party's statement
mentions or implicates other people by name will not make it
inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3) so long as it remains self35 8
inculpatory.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter, disagreed only with Justice O'Connor's application of Rule
804(b)(3) to Harris' statements. She believed that none of his
statements, even the self-inculpatory ones, should have been
admitted because they were so intertwined with other statements

[W]hen part of the confession is actually self-exculpatory, the
generalization on which Rule 804(b)(3) is founded becomes even less
applicable. Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people
are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to
other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the
self-exculpatory statements.
Id.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).

358. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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designed to shift the blame to Williamson that none were
359
sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3).
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, thought the broader reading of "statement" was mandated
by the Advisory Committee Notes, the common law, and "the
general presumption that Congress does not enact statutes that have
almost no effect."' 3 6 0 Thus, he concluded that all statements related
to the declarant's precise statement against interest should be
admitted, subject to only two exceptions: excluding collateral
statements that are so self-serving as to be unreliable, and, "in
cases where the statement was made under circumstances where it
is likely that the declarant had a significant motivation to obtain
be
the entire statement should
favorable
treatment,"
36 1
inadmissible.
The government has good reason to be upset by the Williamson
ruling. Many circuit courts, including the Second Circuit, had
previously read Rule 804(b)(3) broadly to allow collateral
statements into evidence that were not themselves self-inculpatory
when they were part of a narrative confession. 3 62 While Justice
Scalia may be correct in pointing out that the penal interest
exception has not been "eviscerated," as Justice Kennedy believes,
because third-party statements may still, in certain circumstances,
be admissible against the defendant, it seems clear that a
substantial universe of admissibility has been excised. This is not
the course the Court has generally chosen when it has ruled on the
scope of other federal evidentiary rules.

359. Id. at 2439 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg noted that
Harris' statements which were self-incriminating were only marginal evidence
of his guilt. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "They project an image of a person
acting not against his penal interest, but striving mightily to shift principal
responsibility to someone else." Id. at 2439-40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
360. Id. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
361. Id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
362. See United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1986); United States
v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 630-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980); see
also United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1364-65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 321 (1991); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-702 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251-53 (1st Cir. 1976).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

53

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1995], Art. 8

414

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol I11

IX. GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Last, but certainly not least, is the Court's decision in J.E.B v.
Alabama,363 which held that peremptory challenges based on
gender violate the Equal Protection Clause. 364 I include it in my
discussion today because there can be little doubt that J.E.B.,
although a civil case, governs criminal cases as well.
This was a paternity suit brought by the state on behalf of the
mother against the putative father.3 65 One-third of the jury panel
was male but the state used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to
strike males. 366 The defendant eventually used all but one of his
strikes to remove male jurors and the result was an all-female
jury. 367 The defendant argued that Batson v. Kentucky368 should
be extended to gender-based peremptories, an argument that met
with no success in the Alabama courts. 369 In the Supreme Court,
he fared much better.
Justice Blackmun, writing for five justices, traced the history of
the exclusion of women from jury service, and catalogued the
reasons that allowed it until the Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana,370
held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial is violated by such a practice. 37 1 Observing that Taylor "is
consistent with the heightened equal protection scrutiny" 372 that
the Court has applied to gender-based classifications since 1971,
Justice Blackmun had little difficulty fitting gender-based
peremptories under the equal protection principles of Batson. He
rejected the argument that while race-based discrimination is
363. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
364. Id. at 1421.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1422.
367. Id.
368. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (ruling that peremptory challenges based on race
violate Equal Protection Clause).
369. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
370. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

371. Id. at 530. ("Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared
with the constitutional concept ofjury trial.").
372. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
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unacceptable in the courtroom, gender-based discrimination is not,
emphasizing that the history of total exclusion from juries suffered
by women was not different from that suffered by AfricanAmericans. 373
Given the heightened scrutiny which is applicable to genderbased distinctions, the "only question," Justice Blackmun said, "is
whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection
substantially furthers the state's legitimate interest in achieving a
fair and impartial trial. '"374 He concluded it did not. He pointed out
that the state "offer[ed] virtually no support for the conclusion that
gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror's attitudes, ' 375 and
that the state's reasons for permitting the exclusion of males was
based upon "stereotypes" and "gross generalizations" that would
be deemed improper if made on the basis of race. 37 6 He denied that
the Court's ruling implied "the elimination of all peremptory
challenges. ' 377 All it means is that "gender simply may not serve
'378
as a proxy for bias."
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's opinion yet, in a
separate concurrence, she argued that "today's holding should be
limited to the government's use of gender-based peremptory
strikes.

'3 7 9

However, this is an argument which has already twice

been rejected by the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
Inc.,380 and Georgia v. McCollum,3 81 with regard to Batson's
application to civil and criminal defendants respectively, and
shows no signs of life when gender is at issue. She expressed
particular concern that in a battered wife trial, the Court's decision
would most likely preclude a woman "from using her peremptory

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 1425.
Id.
Id. at 1427.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

380. 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that private civil litigants are state actors
when they exercise peremptory challenges).

381. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (stating that criminal defendants are state actors
when they exercise peremptory challenges).
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challenges to ensure that the jury of her peers contains as many
' 3 82
women members as possible[.]"
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor agreed that the Court had to do
what it did in the case at bar even if the decision meant that "we
have added an additional burden to the state and federal trial
process, taken a step closer to eliminating the peremptory
challenge, and diminished the ability of litigants to act on
sometimes accurate gender-based assumptions about juror
383
attitudes."
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment, emphasizing
that the harm flowing from the exercise of peremptories based on
group characteristics "is to personal dignity and to the individual's
'384
right to participate in the political process."
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that peremptory
challenges based on sex do not rise to the same level of
invidiousness as those based on race and that Batson "is best
understood as a recognition that race lies at the core of the
'385
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The angriest dissent was penned by Justice Scalia and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Scalia accused the
majority essentially of writing a "politically correct" decision in
that they were acting "not to eliminate any real denial of equal
protection, but simply to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality
of the sexes ....3 86 Calling most of the majority's opinion "quite
irrelevant to the case at hand,"'3 87 Scalia accused the majority of
reaching its conclusion by "focusing unrealistically upon
individual exercise of the peremptory challenge, and ignoring the
totality of the practice."'388 The system "as a whole is evenhanded," he argued since all groups are equally subject to

382.
383.
384.
385.

J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

386. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
387. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J.,
388. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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peremptories, as well-evidenced by the petitioner's use of his
389
peremptories to strike women from the jury.
The decision in J.E.B. has generated considerable criticism and I
am sure more will come. The major grievances that have been
voiced are that it is analytically unsound, ends-oriented, and
manifests more of a desire to be in vogue than to engage in
principled decision-making. And it is not to Rush Limbaugh that I
am referring.
Professor Linda S. Mullenix has written that "Justice
Blackmun's decision is obfuscated by rhetoric, perhaps because he
'390
has no constitutional peg on which to hang his gender-bias hat."
Stuart Taylor, Jr., a highly-respected Supreme Court commentator,
is even more vehement, stating that "in striking down sex-based
peremptories in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court used a phony
' 39 1
rationale to make bad law.
Taylor argues that the case "had nothing to do with sex
discrimination in any meaningful sense," and that, in exercising
sex-based peremptories, the lawyers did so "with neither the intent,
nor the effect, nor even the appearance of subordinating women to
men, or men to women. ' 392 He attacks as "utter nonsense," and
"dishonest" Justice Blackmun's statement that sex-based
peremptories "'ratify and perpetuate ...stereotypes about the
relative abilities of men and women, [amounting to] a
brand... of... inferiority.' 393 Taylor furthermore asserts that
"[a]s every member of the Court knows, lawyers' use of
peremptories has very little to do with assessing the 'abilities' of
prospective jurors, and nothing to do with judgments of
'inferiority' or with the notion that women are less fit than men to
'394
serve on juries."

389. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
390. Linda S. Mullenix, Court Sets New Rules in Key Areas, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 15, 1994, at C7.
391. Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Jurisprudenceof Gesture, AM. LAW., Sept. 1994, at
46
392. Id.
393. Id. (citation omitted).
394. Id.
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Strong words are these. But I doubt that given the Court's postBatson decisions, any other result was really possible. When the
Court held in Edmondson, that Batson applies in civil cases and
when it held in McCollum, that defense counsel could not use
racially based peremptories, the Court cast its lot, not with the
parties, but with the jurors as individuals. Given that emphasis, it
seemed unrealistic that sex-based discrimination would take a
different path than race-based peremptories.
What of the future? Justice Scalia believes that the Court's ruling
"places all peremptory strikes based on any group characteristics at
risk, since they can all be denominated 'stereotypes.' 39 5 Thus,
strikes based on religion or national origin would also be
precluded. Should the Court extend the Batson principle to other
suspect and even non-suspect classifications, jury impaneling can
become even more prolix than it currently is and there may come a
movement to abolish peremptories entirely. I would like to think
that attorneys and judges will apply a rule of reason in discrete
instances and that a sensible balance can be maintained between
the elimination of offensive stereotyping and the retention of
meaningful peremptories. However, my aspirations do not always
do well in reality.
CONCLUSION

In sum, I feel comfortable characterizing the 1993-94 Term as
one in which the seas were "calmer." The Court's workproduct
seemed both more pragmatic and less strident and, while there
were close votes on a number of key cases, ideological fissures
among the Court's members were less prominent. Substantively,
the Term was very much a mixed bag. The Court ventured forth
again in affording individuals greater protection in civil forfeiture
proceedings, trimmed a bit in the confession and sentencing areas,
and immersed itself in considerable statutory work. Although
strong language was used occasionally by some justices, a greater
"lightness of being" seemed to surround a substantial segment of
the Court's decisions. This may be explicable, in part, by the
395. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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presence of Justice Ginsburg. Apart from the period of adjustment
that normally accompanies a new addition to the Court's
membership, Justice Ginsburg's personality and collegiality may
well have made a special contribution to the Court's mood and
tone. I think it fair to conclude that the Court is now embarked on a
quest for a new identity, one which certainly will continue through
the 1994 Term as Justice Breyer defines his own role in the seat
occupied by Justice Blackmun for almost a quarter century.
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